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IN THE SUPREHE COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

FLOID C. HARTI1AN and
RUTH A. HART11AN,
PlaintiffsAppellants,
vs.
ORA ANN POTTER, HUSKY OIL
COMPANY and CHEVRON OIL
COMPANY,
DefendantsRespondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS HUSKY OIL COMPANY AND
CHEVRON U.S.A. INC.
(FORMERLY CHEVRON OIL
COHPANY)
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action by the Plaintiffs-Appellants, grantees, of a 1951 conveyance, to quiet title to 25% of the oil,
gas and mineral rights of certain real property and for an accounting of and judgment against the Defendants-Respondents for oil and
gas royalty payments allocable to that 25% interest.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The natter came before the Honorable David K. Winder,
Judge of the Third Judicial District

Cou~t

of Salt Lake County

on the separate Motions for Summary Judgment filed by the Plaintiffs-Appellants Floid

c.

and Ruth A. Hartman,

(hereinafter refer-

red to as "Hartmans") and the Defendant-Respondent Ora Ann Potter,
hereinafter referred to ,as "Potter".

The lower court denied
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Appellants-Hartmans' motion and granted the motion of Respondent
Potter.

The Court quieted in Respondent Potter title to the dis-

puted 25% interest in oil, gas and mineral rights and rejected
the claim of the Hartmans to any title or interest therein.

Also,

the Court ordered that the oil and gas royalties being held by the'
Defendant Husky Oil Company,

(hereinafter referred to as "Husky"),

be paid to Respondent Potter
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants-Respondents Husky and Chevron U.S.A., Inc.
seek affirmance of the decision of the lower court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
While li.espondents Husky and Chevron U.S .A., Inc. do not
disagree with the "factual" statements of Appellants in their
Statement of Facts, Respondents do object to the argument and
conclusions inserted therein.

Also, we believe that Appellants'

statement is both insufficient and incomplete and does not make
proper reference to the record on Appeal for this Court's benefit.
Therefore, these Respondents recite the following Statement of
Facts and refer to the record in the lower court by the marked
page number ("R.-"):
In 1951, William M. Potter and Rose K. Potter, husband
and wife, and William Potter, Jr., their son, were the owners of
the center 160 acres of real property in Section 32, Township 1
South, Range 4 West, U.S.M. in Duschesne County, together with
50% of the oil, gas and mineral rights pertaining to the 160
acres.

The Potters had previously owned 100% of the oil, gas
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mineral rights but had conveyed 50% to a Mr. C. R. Bennett of
Tulsa, Oklahoma on July 29th, 1946.

(R. 173).

On June 27th, 1951, Hr. and Hrs. Potter entered into
a contract to sell the 160 acres to the Plaintiffs-Appellants.
(R. 51).

The parties met at the First Security Bank in Roose-

velt, Utah where a bank official, Mrs. J. 0. Orser, prepared a
contract of sale, escrow documents and a warranty deed.
217).

(R. 212-

The bank conducted the business for Plaintiffs and the

Potters and both parties were present and agreed what should be
in the contract.

However, Plaintiff Floid Hartman has no present

recollection of the terms of the contract or the escrow agreement
other than that he was to make yearly payments of principal and
interest to the Potters through the bank and that the deed given
was generally consistent with the contract.

All copies of the

contract for sale and other closing documents were either lost or
destroyed.

(R. 129, 214-217).

At the time of the conveyance,
(R. 216).

the Potters were approximately 70 years old.

Also, a warranty deed from the Potters to Hartmans was
prepared by the bank, signed by Potters and placed into escrow
(R. 83, 217).

until the purchase price was paid by Hartman.

Sometime before December 31st, 1954 the purchase price was paid
and Mr. Hartman received the escrowed deed.

The deed was dated

June 27th, 1951 and recorded April 30th, 1955.

(R. 83).

The

deed provided as follows:
The SW l/4 of the NE 1/4; the NW 1/4 of the SE
1/4; the SE 1/4 of the NW l/4 and the NE 1/4 of
the sw l/4; of Section 32, Township 1 South, Range
4 West, U.S.M. containing 160 acres more or less;
together with all improvements and appurtenances
to said land belonging.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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There is reserved unto the Grantors three-fourths
(3/4) of all the oil, gas and mineral rights to
the above land belonging. With the right of ingress and egress thereon for the purpose of finding and producing oil, gas and minerals thereon.
This deed is given subject to a prior lease of
all the oil, gas and mineral rights to said land
belonging.
(R. 83).
Floid Hartman testified that at the time of the sale
in 1951, he was fully aware if the previous conveyance by Potter
to C. R. Bennett.

The Bennett transaction appeared of record with

the Duschesne County Recorder.

Also, a title opinion given to

Hartmans by the Duschesne County Abstract Company disclosed that
Potters only owned a part of the oil and gas rights.

(R. 227).

Sometime after 1951, Mr. and Mrs. Potter died and William
Potter, Jr., succeeded to their ownership of the oil, gas and mineral rights.

In 1970, the younger William Potter leased the re-

served oil and gas rights to Altex Oil Company.

Subsequently,

William Potter, Jr. also died and the reserved oil, gas and mineral interest passed to the Respondent Ora Ann Potter.

(R.

51).

Also, in 1967, Appellants entered into an oil and gas lease with
Respondent Chevron U.S.A., Inc.
"Chevron") .

(R.

(hereinafter referred to as

5).

In April 1973, an oil well was completed near the property
and production was commenced by Altex Oil Company and Chevron pursuant to a working agreement and division order.

In October 1973,

Husky succeeded to and presently retains the leasehold interests
of both Altex and Chevron Oil Companies.

(R. 37-41).

While Chevron made lease rental payments to Appellants,
prior to 1973, Altex and its successors also paid Respondent
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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well commenced in April 1973, Respondent Husky has paid oil and
gas royalties to Respondent Potter on the basis of her ownership
of one-half (1/2) of the oil, gas and mineral rights.
one/half (1/2) owned by successors of C.R. Bennett).
payments have ever been made to Appellants.

(The other
No royalty

(R. 40-46, 76).

On May 13th, 1976 Appellants filed this action to quiet
their claimed l/4th interest in the oil, gas and mineral rights
which Appellants allege was granted to them by the 1951 deed.

Ap-

pellants also demanded judgment against all the Defendants for the
amounts paid to Defendant Potter allocable to the disputed l/4
(R. 2).

interest.

All the Respondents answered, denied Appel-

lants claim to any oil, gas and mineral rights, and asserted that
the 1951 deed reserved in the grantors the 50% interest in the oil,
gas, and mineral rights owned by the grantors at the time of the
conveyance.

(R. 105,109, 155-159).

Following the deposition of Appellant Floid Hartman
(R. 204) and numerous interrogatories, Appellants and Respondents
Potter filed separate Motions for Summary Judgment.
171).

(R. 160,

In a Memorandum Decision dated June 26th, 1978 the trial

court granted Summary Judgment to Respondent Potter which judgment was entered on July lOth, 1978.

(R. 185-186, 193-196).

The

lower court determined that the 1951 deed effectively reserved
in the Grantors their 50% oil, gas and mineral rights owned at
the time of the conveyance and conveyed no interest in the oil
and gas rights to Appellants Hartman.

(R. 193-195).
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POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING
SUM!1ARY JUDGHENT TO RESPONDENT:.; AND IN
DENYING APPELLANTS' MOTION
This is merely a case of determining the language of
a deed wherein the grantors reserved to themselves 75% of all
the oil, gas and mineral rights when they only owned 50% of
the same.

Appellants claim their interpretation of the language

requires that title to 1/4 of the oil, gas and mineral rights be
quieted in Appellants because of what they assert they believed
at the time.

In the lower court, Appellants relied upon the

theory that the court should seek out the intention of the parties to the c0nveyance.

Appellants do not claim any fraud or

mutual mistake in the deed as given nor do they seek reformation
of the instrument.

Appellants do not claim or argue that the

grantors breached any warranty of title.

Appellants merely

desire the court to construe a deed so as to satisfy Appellants'
interests.
Respondents submit that in construing the language of
the deed that the court must consider and give effect to the
entire document.

When the entire language of the document is

considered the only reasonable interpretation of the deed is
that the grantors conveyed the surface rights to Appellants but
retained all of the mineral rights which they owned.
In essence, Appellants'claim is that

1)

the deed is

obviously ambiguous and, therefore, the court should apply
Appellants' arbitrary rules of construction to construe the
deed against the grantor and in accordance with the claimed
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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"interpretation of the parties"; and

2) the court should

determine and give effect to the "true intent" of the parties
by only considering Appellants' self-serving statements and
actions.

The lower court properly rejected both assertions.
As to Appellants argument that a deed is always con-

strued against the grantor, this Court has previously stated
that this rule is one of last resort only and should not be
applied when the court can satisfactorily and reasonably give
effect to the intent of the parties.

Russell v. Geyser -Marion

Gold Mining Company, 18 U.2d 363, 423 P.2d 487, 490 (1967).

In

Russell, the court refused to arbitrarily interprete a deed
against the grantor when a different result was intended in the
document.
(1962)

In Howard v. Howard, 12 U.2d 407, 367 P.2d 193, 195

this Court also stated that a grantor's intention should

be given effect if reasonably determinable.

The meaning of a

reservation in a deed should be arrived at by determining the
intent of the grantors at the time of the conveyance.

Jolly v.

Wilson, 478 P.2d 886 (Okla., 1970), Whittle v. Wolff, 249 Or.
217, 437 P.2d 114 (1968).

Appellants also assert that their

own statements of what they believed and what they claim was
discussed with the grantors, now deceased, evidence the "intention of the parties."

Such testimony is inadmissible under

Section 78-24-2, U.C.A. 1953, as amended.

Even were it admis-

sible, it is most self-serving and asserts no facts but only
makes claims of what Appellants "believed", all unsupported by
the record.
Appellants are not able to show that the intentions of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the grantors, or even of both the parties, were that the Appellants were to receive any oil, gas and mineral rights.

Appel-

lants do not in any way support their naked assertions of what
both parties intended by any reference to the record before the
court.

The record provides no admissible evidence that the deed

was ever intended to convey to Appellants any mineral rights.
Appellants only claim they "believed that
ceiving 1/4 of the mineral rights"

[they] were re-

(R. 179, 5)

This is nothing

more than the most blatant of self-serving statements and is entirely inconsistant with Appellant Hartman's admission that he had
both actual and constructive knowledge of the mineral rights owned
by Potters and that Potters had made a previous conveyance.
227) .

(R.

Appellants certainly cannot be heard to say that the lower

court should have awarded them Judgment based on the record before
it.

Rather, the record before this court confirms that the court

properly awarded Summary Judgment to the Respondents based on the
document itself and the situation of the parties at the time of
the conveyance.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT
RESPONDENT POTTER OWNS SOPERCENT OF
THE GAS, OIL AND MINERAL RIGHTS
Appellants contend that there is "little question"
that the deed (R. 83)

from Potters to Appellants is "ambiguous".

For some strange reason Appellants also seem to absurdly suggest
that the deed would even be ambiguous had Potters owned all 100%
of the oil, gas and mineral rights at the time of the conveyance.
Since
the deed is ambiguous, Appellants say, the court must look
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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to extrinsic evidence (e.g. Appellants self-serving statements
of believe) to determine the intent of the parties.
While Respondents agree that the intent of the parties
is important to construe an ambiguous document it does not neeessarily follow that a court must look beyond the document to
extrinsic evidence to determine the intention of the language.
The court has a duty to ascertain the intent from the language
of the document itself and not from what a party secretly believed or intended.

In construing a deed it is necessary to

give effect and meaning to each word and clause of the document.
Fowler v. Tarbet, 45 Wash.2d 332, 274 P.2d 341 (1954), Kennedy
v. Monroe, 165 Kan. 168, 193 P.2d 220, 224 (1948 , Mitchel

v.

Brown, 43 Cal.2d 217, 110 P.2d 456 (1941).
The pertinent clauses of the deed, the grant and the
habendum clause,when considered and interpreted together are
not inconsistent with each other or with Respondents' position.
. There is reserved into the Grantors threefourths (3/4) of all the oil, gas and mineral
rights to the above land belonging . . . This
deed is given subject to a prior lease of all
the oil, gas and mineral rights to said land
belonging.
But to interprete the reservation as contended by
Appellants would be directly contrary to the habendum clause stating
that the deed is given subject to the prior interest in the
oil, gas and mineral rights.
Respondents

sub~it

that whether the court looks only at

the language of the deed or also considers proper extrinsic evidence
from the record the result is the same.

The plain meaning of the

document
does not change. The grantors, in conveying to the AppelSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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lants surface rights to the property, excluded from the conveyance and their warranty the previous grant of oil, gas and mineral rights by providing that the "deed is given subject to a
prior lease".

The record indicates that the conveyance of 50%

of the mineral rights to Bennett in 1945 was the only "prior
lease".

In addition to the exclusion from the deed of the prev-

iously conveyed 50%, the grantors also reserved unto themselves
75% of all the oil, gas and mineral rights belonging to the land.
While it is possible that the grantors may have mistakenly
thought they still owned 75% and not 50%, the intent of the language is clear: the grantors' deed excluded the oil, gas and mineral rights previously conveyed and reserved to the grantors the
remaining rights, whether it was 75 percent or less than 75 percent.

Respondents position is even more clear when considering

the facts that Hartman had both actual and constructive knowledge
of the prior conveyance to which the deed was subject and that
with that knowledge Hartman helped tell the bank what to put in
the agreement.

(R. 215, 227).

A party who expressly excludes or reserves from a conveyance his entire oil, gas and mineral interest, albeit in
reality he owns

less than what he believes, should be deemed to

have retained that portion which he in fact owns.

Any contrary

result would be patently unreasonable and arbitrary.
Appellants assert there are three possible interpretatioru
from the deed and that their interpretation is the only reasonable
one when the intent of the grantees (Hartmans)

is considered.

Appellants attempt to completely ignore their own knowledge of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the prior 50% conveyance and that the deed was expressly made subject to that prior interest.

With that knowledge Hartmans helped

the bank draft the deed.
Appellants claim that the 75% reservation was merely intended by the grantors to reserve the previously conveyed 50% and
only 25% of the remaining 50%, thereby conveying to Hartmans 25%.
In reliance on such intention of the parties, Hartmans say they
s~sequently

conveyed the property to Lyard McConkie "reserving

25% in the grantors".

Hartmans do not tell us whether the intent

of the parties to the subsequent conveyance was the same as the
intent Appellants claim under the Potter conveyance.

Did Hartmans

in their subsequent conveyance intend to reserve the 25% of the oil,
gas and mineral rights previously reserved by Potters?

If not, did

Hartmans intend to sell McConkie 75% of the mineral rights which
they did not own?
of Title?

Did Hartmans intend to breach their Warranty

The obvious answers to these questions do not support

what Hartmans claim the instant parties intended.

This court has

been previously made acquainted with the problems of Appellants
in drafting and interpreting documents of sale.
529 P.2d 801 (Utah 1974).

McConkie v. Hartman,

Unfortunately this court was not then

aware that Hartmans did not even own what they purported to reserve
from their conveyance to the McConkies.
The only basis for support of the position espoused
by Appellants is by application in this case of the Duhig doctrine
stated in Duhig v. Peavey-Hoore Lumber Co., 135 Tex. 503, 144
S.W.2d 878 (1940).

However, Appellants have not argued the Dugig
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doctrine in the lower court or in this court and this court should
not seek to apply such a doctrine to this case.

Furthermore, the

intent and effect of the recording laws of Utah makes such a doctrine inappropriate in Utah.
1953 as amended) .

(Sections 57-1-6 and 57-3-2, U.C.A.,

Not only were the Hartmans advised by the

county records that Potters had only 1/2 of the minerals, Hartmans admit actual knowledge.

Therefore Appellants should have

known that if Potters were to retain and reserve three-fourths
of all the minerals belonging to the land, that Appellants would
receive none.

Also, the express language of the conveyance ex-

cludes therefrom the prior conveyance and Potters cannot be
deemed to have breached any warranty of title under the construction given the deed by the lower court.

Price v. Atlantic Refin-

ing Company, 79 N.M. 629, 447 P.2d 509 (196&)

and Mitchel v.

Brown, supra.
The lower court properly construed the deed as reserving in the grantors all of the oil, gas and mineral rights owned
by the grantors (50%).

Appellants should not be heard to exclaim

that the reservation was intended to reserve the 50% interest
owned by Bennett when Appellants knew that the grantors did not
own that 50% and the same 50% was excluded from the deed by the deec
being made subject to it.

CONCLUSION
This court should affirm the Summary Judgment of the
lower court that title to 50% of the mineral rights is quieted in
Respondent Potter since the reservation by Potters of 75% acted to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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reserve to the grantors the balance of all the oil, gas and
mineral rights owned by the Potters (50%) and no rights passed
to Appellants.

Respectfully Submitted

Clark R. Nielsen
NIELSEN, HENRIOD, GOTTFREDSON & PECK
Attorneys for Respondents Husky and Chevro:
410 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Served the foregoing by mailing two copies thereof, postage prepaid, to:
Mr Kenneth M. Hisatake
1825 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105
and
Robert G. Pruitt, Jr.
Suite 875 Beneficial Life Tower
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
this

~day of December, 1978.
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